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Abstract
Machine learning models, including state-of-the-art
deep neural networks, are vulnerable to small perturba-
tions that cause unexpected classification errors. This un-
expected lack of robustness raises fundamental questions
about their generalization properties and poses a serious
concern for practical deployments. As such perturbations
can remain imperceptible – the formed adversarial exam-
ples demonstrate an inherent inconsistency between vul-
nerable machine learning models and human perception –
some prior work casts this problem as a security issue. De-
spite the significance of the discovered instabilities and en-
suing research, their cause is not well understood and no
effective method has been developed to address the prob-
lem. In this paper, we present a novel theory to explain why
this unpleasant phenomenon exists in deep neural networks.
Based on that theory, we introduce a simple, efficient, and
effective training approach, Batch Adjusted Network Gradi-
ents (BANG), which significantly improves the robustness of
machine learning models. While the BANG technique does
not rely on any form of data augmentation or the utilization
of adversarial images for training, the resultant classifiers
are more resistant to adversarial perturbations while main-
taining or even enhancing the overall classification perfor-
mance.
1. Introduction
Machine learning is broadly used in various real-world
vision applications and recent advances in deep learning
have made deep neural networks the most powerful learning
models that can be successfully applied to different vision
problems [27, 25, 7, 28, 20, 14, 18, 17, 29]. The recent
performance gain is mainly the result of improvements in
two fields, namely, building more powerful learning models
[25, 7] and designing better strategies to avoid overfitting
[24]. These advancements are then leveraged by the use of
larger datasets and massive GPU-enhanced computing.
Although deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve state-
(a) MNIST Samples and Their Distortions Yielding Misclassifications
(b) CIFAR-10 Samples and Their Distortions Yielding Misclassifications
Figure 1: IMPROVING ROBUSTNESS VIA BANG. This fig-
ure demonstrates the enhanced robustness against perturbations
generated via the non-gradient-based hot/cold adversarial gener-
ation method on MNIST digits and CIFAR-10 samples displayed
in top rows of (a) and (b). Underneath the raw test images, we
show their distorted versions formed by the smallest perturbations
that change the correctly classified class labels of the test sam-
ples. The second rows of (a) and (b) present perturbations that
we obtained on regularly trained learning models, while the last
rows show examples that we generated on networks trained via
our Batch Adjusted Network Gradients (BANG) approach. As in-
dicated by most of the perturbations being highly perceptible, the
learning models trained with BANG have become more robust to
adversarial perturbations.
of-the-art performance in a wide range of tasks, the gen-
eralization properties of these learning models were ques-
tioned by Szegedy et al. [26] when the existence of adver-
sarial examples was revealed. DNNs are capable of learn-
ing high-level feature embeddings that enable them to be
successfully adapted to different problems. They were gen-
erally considered to generalize well and, hence, expected to
be robust to moderate distortions to their inputs. Surpris-
ingly, adversarial examples formed by applying impercep-
tible perturbations to otherwise correctly recognized inputs
can lead machine learning models – including state-of-the-
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art DNNs – to misclassify those samples, often with high
confidence. This highly unexpected and intriguing property
of machine learning models highlights a fundamental prob-
lem that researchers have been trying to solve.
To explain why adversarial examples exist, several con-
troversial explanations were proposed. As hypothesized in
[4, 2], adversarial instability exists due to DNNs acting as
high-dimensional linear classifiers that allow even imper-
ceptibly small, well-aligned perturbations applied to inputs
to spread among higher dimensions and radically change
the outputs. This belief was challenged in [19], where –
by analyzing and experimenting with DNNs trained to rec-
ognize objects in more unconstrained conditions – it was
demonstrated that those classifiers are only locally linear to
changes on the recognized object, otherwise DNNs act non-
linearly. After performing various experiments, Gu et al. [6]
concluded that adversarial instability is rather related to “in-
trinsic deficiencies in the training procedure and objective
function than to model topology.”
The problem addressed in this paper is not only about
preventing attacks via adversarial examples, the focus is on
the overall robustness and generalizability of DNNs. This
fundamental problem of deep learning has recently received
increasing attention by researchers [3, 8, 21]. Considering
state-of-the-art learning models applied to computer vision
tasks, the classification of many incorrectly or uncertainly
recognized inputs can be corrected and improved by small
perturbations [30, 22], so this is a naturally occurring prob-
lem for learning-based vision systems.
In this paper, we introduce our theory on the instability
of machine learning models and the existence of adversarial
examples: evolutionary stalling. During training, network
weights are adjusted using the gradient of loss, evolving to
eventually classify examples correctly. Ideally, we prefer
broad flat regions around samples to achieve good gener-
alization [11] and adversarial robustness [2]. However, af-
ter a training sample is correctly classified, its contribution
to the loss and, thus, on forming the weight updates is re-
duced. As the evolution of the local decision surface stalls,
the correctly classified samples cannot further flatten and
extend their surroundings to improve generalization. There-
fore, as the contributions of those correctly classified train-
ing samples to boundary adjustments are highly decreased
compared to other batch elements, samples can end up be-
ing stuck close to decision boundaries and, hence, suscepti-
ble to small perturbations flipping their classifications.
To mitigate evolutionary stalling, we propose our Batch
Adjusted Network Gradients (BANG) training algorithm.
We experimentally evaluate robustness using a combina-
tion of gradient- and non-gradient-based adversarial pertur-
bations, and random distortions. The paper explores the
impact of BANG parameters and architectural variations,
such as Dropout [24], on instability and adversarial robust-
ness. In conclusion, we validate our theory by experimen-
tally demonstrating that BANG significantly improves the
robustness of deep neural networks optimized on two small
datasets while the trained learning models maintain or even
improve their overall classification performance.
2. Related Work
Deep neural networks (DNNs) achieve high performance
on various tasks as they are able to learn non-local gen-
eralization priors from training data. Counter-intuitively,
Szegedy et al. [26] showed that machine learning models
can misclassify samples that are formed by slightly perturb-
ing correctly recognized inputs. These so-called adversarial
examples are indistinguishable from their originating coun-
terparts to human observers, and their unexpected existence
itself presents a problem. The authors introduced the first
technique that is capable of reliably finding adversarial per-
turbations and claimed that some adversarial examples gen-
eralize across different learning models.
A computationally cheaper adversarial example genera-
tion algorithm, the Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method, was
presented by Goodfellow et al. [4]. While this approach
also uses the inner state of DNNs, it is more efficient as
FGS requires the gradient of loss to be calculated only once.
The authors demonstrated that by using adversarial exam-
ples generated with FGS implicitly in an enhanced objective
function, both accuracy and robustness of the trained classi-
fiers can be improved. In their paper focusing on adversarial
machine learning, Kurakin et al. [13] proposed new algo-
rithms extending the FGS method to target a specific class
and to calculate and apply gradients iteratively instead of a
single gradient calculation via FGS. The authors compared
the effect of different types of adversarial examples used for
implicit adversarial training and found that the results vary
based upon the type of the applied adversarial examples.
Rozsa et al. [23] introduced the non-gradient-based
hot/cold approach, which is capable of efficiently producing
multiple adversarial examples for each input. They demon-
strated that using samples explicitly with higher magnitudes
of adversarial perturbations than the sufficient minimal can
outperform regular adversarial training. The authors also
presented a new metric – the Perceptual Adversarial Simi-
larity Score (PASS) – to better measure the distinguishabil-
ity of original and adversarial image pairs in terms of hu-
man perception. As the commonly used L2 or L∞ norms
are very sensitive to small geometric distortions that can re-
main unnoticeable to us, PASS is more applicable to quan-
tify similarity and the quality of adversarial examples.
Although adversarial training, both implicit and explicit,
was demonstrated to decrease the instability of learning
models, forming those examples is still computationally ex-
pensive, which limits the application of such techniques.
Furthermore, considering the various adversarial generation
techniques, utilizing certain types of those samples might
not lead to improved robustness to adversarial examples
of other techniques. Alternatively, Zheng et al. [30] pro-
posed their stability training as a lightweight and still ef-
fective method to stabilize DNNs against naturally occur-
ring distortions in the visual input. The introduced training
procedure uses an additional stability objective that makes
DNNs learn weights that minimize the prediction difference
of original and perturbed images. In order to obtain general
robustness and not rely on any class of perturbations, the au-
thors applied Gaussian noise to distort the training images.
Gu et al. [6] conducted experiments with different net-
work topologies, pre-processing, and training procedures to
improve the robustness of DNNs. The authors proposed the
Deep Contractive Network (DCN), which imposes a layer-
wise contractive penalty in a feed-forward DNN. The for-
mulated penalty aims to minimize output variances with
respect to perturbations in inputs, and enable the network
to explicitly learn flat, invariant regions around the training
data. Based on positive initial results, they concluded that
adversarial instability is rather the result of the intrinsic de-
ficiencies in the training procedure and objective function
than of model topologies.
Luo et al. [19] proposed a foveation-based technique that
selects and uses only a sub-region of the image during clas-
sification. As the authors demonstrated, the negative effect
of foveated perturbations to the classification scores can
be significantly reduced compared to entire perturbations.
Graese et al. [5] showed that transformations of the normal
image acquisition process can also negate the effect of the
carefully crafted adversarial perturbations. While these pre-
processing techniques can alleviate the problem posed by
adversarial images, they do not solve the inherent instability
of DNNs. In other words, these methods treat the symptoms
and not the disease.
In summary, a wide variety of more or less efficient
approaches were proposed in the literature that all aim at
improving the robustness and generalization properties of
DNNs, but none of those proved to be effective enough.
3. Approach
In this section, we first briefly describe our intuition
about why the unexpected adversarial instability exists in
machine learning models. Afterwards, we present our sim-
ple and straightforward modification in the training proce-
dure that aims to optimize weights in a way that the result-
ing DNNs become more robust to distortions of their inputs.
3.1. Intuition
During training, some inputs in the batch are correctly
and others are incorrectly classified. In general, the calcu-
lated loss and, thus, the gradient of loss for the misclassified
ones are larger than for the correctly classified inputs of the
same batch. Therefore, in each training iteration most of the
weight updates go into learning those inputs that are badly
predicted. On the other hand, the correctly classified sam-
ples do not have a significant impact on advancing decision
boundaries and can remain in the positions close to what
they obtained when becoming correctly classified. Due to
this evolutionary stalling, samples with low gradients can-
not form a flatter, more invariant region around themselves.
Consequently, samples of those regions remain more sus-
ceptible to adversarial perturbations – even a small pertur-
bation can push them back into an incorrect class. By in-
creasing the contribution of the correctly classified exam-
ples in the batch on the weight updates, and forcing them
to continue improving decision boundaries, it is reasonable
to think that we can flatten the decision space around those
training samples and train more robust DNNs.
3.2. Implementation
The core concept of our Batch Adjusted Network Gradi-
ents (BANG) approach is a variation of batch normalization
[9]. However, rather than trying to balance the inputs of
the layers, we seek to ensure that the contributions on the
weight updates are more balanced among batch elements
by scaling their gradients.
Let us dive into the details and introduce our notations
we use to formulate BANG. In short, we scale the gradients
of batch elements that will be used to compute the weight
updates in each training iteration. Let us consider a network
fw with weights w in a layered structure having layers y(l)
where l ∈ [1, L], with their respective weights w(l):
fw(xi) = y
(L)
(
y(L−1)
(
. . .
(
y(1)(xi)
)
. . .
))
. (1)
For a given input xi, the partial derivatives of the loss
E(fw, xi) with respect to the output of layer y(l) are:
κ
(l)
i = κ
(l)(xi) =
∂Ei
∂y
(l)
i
. (2)
For simplicity, we leave out the structure of the weightsw(l)
in layers and the structure of the layer outputs which can be
either one-dimensional for fully connected layers or three-
dimensional for convolutional layers.
With BANG, our goal is to balance gradients in the batch
by scaling up those that have lower magnitudes. In order
to do so, we determine the highest gradient for the batch
having N inputs xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , N} at given layer y(l) in
terms of L2 norm. We use that as the basis for balancing
the magnitudes of gradients in the batch. Weight updates
are calculated after scaling each derivative κi in the batch
with the element-wise learning rate:
η
(l)
i =
 maxi′∈[1,N ] ‖κ
(l)
i′ ‖
‖κ(l)i ‖

ρ
(l)
i
(3)
where:
ρ
(l)
i = 
(l)
1− ‖κ(l)i ‖
max
i′∈[1,N ]
‖κ(l)i′ ‖
 . (4)
As a key parameter for our approach, (l) specifies the de-
gree of gradient balancing among batch elements. While the
exponent ρ(l)i might appear a little complex and ambiguous,
its sole purpose is to scale up gradients with small magni-
tudes more than others having larger L2 norms.
Assuming that the regular backward pass combines the
gradients of the batch elements by calculating:
∇fw(l) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
∂Ei
∂w(l)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
κ
(l)
i
∂y(l)
∂w(l)
(5)
which is normally scaled with the learning rate and then
used to update weights (after combining with the previous
weight update scaled with momentum), BANG produces:
∇fw(l) = β(l)
1
N
N∑
i=1
η
(l)
i
∂Ei
∂w(l)
, (6)
where β(l) is the second (set of) parameter(s) of our ap-
proach used for scaling. In general, β(l) acts as a local
learning rate that can play a more important role in future
work. Throughout our experiments, we keep BANG param-
eters fixed for all layers: (l) =  and β(l) = β (which will
actually just modify the original learning rate η).
Note that although our approach changes the actual cal-
culation of weight updates for the layers, there is no im-
pact on the backpropagation of the original gradient down
the network. Finally, we implemented BANG by applying
small modifications to the regular training procedure with
negligible computational overhead.
4. Experiments
To evaluate our approach, we conducted experiments on
the slightly modified versions of LeNet [16] and “CIFAR-
10 quick” models distributed with Caffe [10]. Namely, after
running preliminary experiments with BANG, we added a
Dropout layer [24] to both model architectures that serves
multiple purposes. We observed that BANG tends to cause
overfitting on the trained LeNet networks, and the resul-
tant models made very confident classifications – even when
they misclassified the test images. While the additional
Dropout layer alleviates both problems, the adjusted net-
work architectures also result in improved classification per-
formances with both regular and BANG training.
After obtaining learning models with regular and BANG
training, we assess and compare the robustness of those
classifiers in two ways. It is important to note that we do
not select the best training models based on their perfor-
mance on the validation set for these evaluations, but we
simply use the models obtained at the last training itera-
tion. As our primary goal is to measure the evolving robust-
ness, we believe that this decision leads to a fairer compari-
son, however, the classification performance of the selected
models are not optimal. Finally, we would like to mention
that we conducted experiments to discover the effectiveness
of BANG used for fine-tuning regularly trained models, and
found that the robustness of the resultant networks are not
even comparable to those that we trained from scratch.
First, we evaluate the adversarial vulnerability against
two adversarial example generation methods: the gradient-
based Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) method [4] and the non-
gradient-based hot/cold approach [23]. Although the latter
is capable of forming multiple adversarial perturbations for
each input, we only target the most similar class with the
hot/cold approach, referred to as HC1.
We aim to form adversarial perturbations for every cor-
rectly classified image from the MNIST [15] or CIFAR-
10 [12] test set, respectively. We consider an adversar-
ial example generation attempt successful, if the direction
specified by either FGS or HC1 leads to a misclassification,
where the only constraint is that the discrete pixel values are
in [0, 255] range. Of course, this limitation means that the
formed perturbations may or may not be adversarial in na-
ture as they can be highly perceptible to human observers.
We compare the adversarial robustness of classifiers by col-
lecting measures to quantify the quality of the produced ad-
versarial examples. For this purpose, we calculate the Per-
ceptual Adversarial Similarity Score (PASS) [23] of origi-
nal and adversarial image pairs, and we also determine the
L∞ norms of adversarial perturbations. Although the L∞
norm is not a good metric to quantify adversarial quality in
terms of human perception, it can demonstrate how far the
actual perturbed image is from the original sample.
Second, we quantify how the robustness of the learning
models evolve during training by applying a more general
approach. For a given pair of classifiers where one was
regularly trained while the other was obtained by BANG
training, we add a certain level of random noise to 100 test
images from each class that are correctly classified by both
networks at all tested stages and compute the proportion of
perturbed images that are classified differently than the orig-
inating one. While the previously described test assessing
the adversarial vulnerability explores only two directions –
specified by the FGS method and the HC1 approach – ap-
plying 1000 random distortions to each inspected image for
every noise level gives us a more general evaluation.
Although experimenting with random noise is more uni-
versal as it does not rely on any specific adversarial genera-
tion technique, small random perturbations that cause mis-
classifications are hard to find [23] and, hence, the collected
Table 1: LENET TRAINING. This table highlights the difference between LeNet models obtained by using regular (R0-R1) and BANG
training (B0-B5). Accuracy on the MNIST test set, the achieved success rates of FGS and HC1 adversarial example generation methods
with PASS scores and L∞ norms of the produced examples on the MNIST test set are listed.
ID β  Accuracy FGS-Rate FGS-PASS FGS-L∞ HC1-Rate HC1-PASS HC1-L∞
R0 - - 99.16% 90.33% 0.4072± 0.1081 40.51± 15.72 99.53% 0.7535± 0.1143 122.60± 49.46
R1 - - 99.15% 91.41% 0.4072± 0.1065 40.70± 15.88 99.77% 0.7517± 0.1160 122.16± 49.07
B0 1.00 0.785 99.16% 3.51% 0.6806± 0.1457 8.34± 04.32 95.13% 0.5359± 0.2023 187.86± 63.66
B1 1.00 0.815 99.22% 1.68% 0.7638± 0.1367 5.52± 02.86 94.19% 0.4880± 0.2110 201.84± 62.51
B2 1.20 0.810 99.31% 2.13% 0.7579± 0.1452 5.57± 03.05 94.56% 0.5129± 0.2015 186.10± 63.77
B3 1.35 0.780 99.25% 3.86% 0.6763± 0.1471 8.28± 04.26 94.73% 0.5709± 0.2127 178.11± 65.76
B4 1.50 0.840 99.11% 1.52% 0.8220± 0.1310 4.19± 03.01 97.68% 0.4669± 0.1881 203.50± 58.97
B5 1.60 0.780 99.32% 4.45% 0.6771± 0.1487 8.20± 04.40 98.95% 0.6376± 0.1829 146.96± 61.97
(a) Accuracy (b) FGS Success Rate (c) HC1 PASS
Figure 2: LENET MODELS TRAINED WITH BANG. These plots summarize our results on LeNet models trained with BANG using
combinations of β and . We tested a grid of those two parameters where β ∈ [1.0, 1.6] with step size 0.05, and  ∈ [0.78, 0.84] with step
size 0.005. We trained a single model with each combination and show (a) the obtained accuracy on the MNIST test set, (b) the achieved
success rates by using FGS and (c) the mean PASS score of HC1 adversarial examples on the MNIST test images. Each solid green line
represents the level of regularly trained learning models. For better visual representation we applied interpolation.
results are qualitatively not as good as explicitly forming
adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, in order to evaluate
the stability of the trained classifiers, we distorted the im-
ages with Gaussian noise far beyond the noise level that can
be considered imperceptible or adversarial.
4.1. LeNet on MNIST
We commenced our experiments by evaluating BANG
on the LeNet model optimized on the MNIST dataset.
MNIST contains 70k images overall: 50k used for training,
10k for validation, and the remaining 10k for testing. The
tested network originally has four layers (two convolutional
and two fully connected) – extended with one additional
Dropout layer – that we optimize without changing the hy-
perparameters distributed with Caffe. The learning model
is trained with a batch size of 64 for 10k iterations using the
inverse decay learning rate policy with an initial learning
rate of 0.01.
Since our training procedure has two parameters, β de-
fined in Equation (6) and  introduced in Equation (4), we
trained LeNet models with parameter combinations from a
grid, and evaluated the accuracy and adversarial vulnerabil-
ity of the trained classifiers. The results of the conducted
experiments are visualized in Figure 2, we also show accu-
racies and metrics indicating adversarial robustness in Ta-
ble 1 for some models obtained with regular training (R0-
R1) and optimized with BANG training (B0-B5).
As we can see in Table 1, FGS success rates achieved by
regular training can be dramatically decreased by BANG:
the rate drops from above 90% to below 2%. Almost ev-
ery single failed adversarial example generation attempt is
due to blank gradients – the gradient of loss with respect to
the original image and its ground-truth label contains only
zeros – which means that methods utilizing that gradient of
loss cannot succeed. As we increase , or in other words,
as we balance the contributions of batch elements more by
scaling up gradients with lower magnitudes, the resultant
classifiers become more resistant to gradient-based adver-
sarial generation methods. Although the success rates ob-
tained by the HC1 method remain relatively high, the qual-
(a) Regular Training (b) BANG Training (c) Absolute Improvement
Figure 3: LENET: ROBUSTNESS TO RANDOM DISTORTIONS. These plots show the evolving robustness of LeNet models: (a)
obtained with regular training (R0 from Table 1), (b) trained with BANG (B1 from Table 1), and (c) displays the improvement. After
identifying 100 test images per class that are correctly classified by both networks at every 500 iterations, we perturb each 1000 times by
adding the level of Gaussian noise specified by the standard deviation, and test the networks at several stages of training. The plots show
the percentage of distortions yielding misclassifications. For better visual representation we applied interpolation.
ities of HC1 examples degrade significantly on LeNet mod-
els trained with BANG compared to the regular training as
displayed in Figure 2(c). This degradation is highlighted
by both decreasing PASS scores and by the significantly in-
creased L∞ norms of perturbations listed in Table 1.
With respect to the achieved classification performances,
we find that there can be a level of degradation depending
on the selected values for β and . This phenomenon can
be seen in Figure 2(a); it is partially due to random initial-
izations and can be the result of overfitting or our decision
to evaluate all networks at 10k training iterations. Still, we
can observe that BANG can yield improved classification
performance over regular training paired with improved ro-
bustness as listed in Table 1.
Additionally, we conducted experiments to quantify
and compare how the robustness to random perturbations
evolves during training. For this general approach, we se-
lected to test two classifiers from Table 1: R0 optimized
with regular training and B1 trained with BANG. We can
see in Figure 3(a) that the regularly trained model is initially
highly susceptible to larger distortions, but as the training
progresses it becomes more stable, and settles at approxi-
mately 20% with respect to the strongest class of Gaussian
noise that we formed by using standard deviation of 100
pixels. Contrarily, the classifier trained with BANG main-
tains significantly lower rates throughout the whole training
as shown in Figure 3(b), and after 10k iterations only 3% of
the strongest distortions can alter the original classification.
The absolute improvements are displayed in Figure 3(c).
4.2. CIFAR-10
We also evaluated training with BANG on the so-called
“CIFAR-10 quick” model of Caffe trained on the CIFAR-
10 dataset. CIFAR-10 consists of 60k images, 50k training
images, and 10k images used for both validation and testing
purposes. The network architecture originally has five lay-
ers (three convolutional and two fully connected) that we
extended with one Dropout layer, and the learning model
is trained with a batch size of 100 for 20k iterations (40
epochs). We use a fixed learning rate of 0.001 that we de-
crease by a factor of 10 after 36 epochs, and once again after
another 2 epochs.
Due to the different nature of CIFAR-10 training,
we slightly adjusted BANG parameters. Specifically, as
the classification performance is significantly worse than
achieved by LeNet on MNIST yielding proportionately
more incorrectly classified samples in each mini-batch, we
applied lower local learning rates (β) and higher values for
scaling (). Furthermore, we found that scaling incorrectly
classified inputs less than correct ones has beneficial effects
on robustness, hence, we applied 50% of the specified 
values on the incorrectly classified batch elements. Sim-
ilarly to our conducted experiments on LeNet, we trained
classifiers on CIFAR-10 with all possible combinations of
β and  parameters of a grid and then measured the accu-
racy and adversarial vulnerability of each of those networks.
The results are visualized in Figure 4, and for some models
obtained with regular training (R0-R1) and optimized with
BANG training (B0-B5), we show accuracies and metrics
indicating adversarial robustness in Table 2.
As we can see in Table 2, FGS success rates achieved by
regular training are significantly decreased by BANG: the
rate drops from approximately 96% to 34% where, again,
the majority of the failed adversarial example generation at-
tempts are due to blank gradients. Figure 4(b) shows that
as we increase , the classifiers become more resistant to
gradient-based adversarial generation methods. The higher
levels of success rates in comparison to LeNet might sim-
Table 2: CIFAR-10 TRAINING. This table shows the difference between classifiers obtained using regular (R0-R1) and BANG training
(B0-B5). The accuracy on the CIFAR-10 test set, the achieved success rates of FGS and HC1 adversarial example generation methods with
PASS scores and L∞ norms of the formed examples on the CIFAR-10 test images are listed.
ID β  Accuracy FGS-Rate FGS-PASS FGS-L∞ HC1-Rate HC1-PASS HC1-L∞
R0 - - 79.59% 96.52% 0.9553± 0.0969 4.08± 06.40 98.97% 0.9669± 0.1005 18.15± 29.80
R1 - - 79.55% 96.71% 0.9513± 0.1057 4.43± 07.05 98.91% 0.9557± 0.1332 22.16± 39.77
B0 0.40 0.855 79.26% 34.27% 0.9511± 0.1302 4.11± 10.31 95.94% 0.8712± 0.1649 55.52± 49.98
B1 0.45 0.805 80.43% 45.94% 0.9818± 0.0548 2.04± 02.49 96.20% 0.7966± 0.2438 77.34± 71.20
B2 0.75 0.800 79.74% 41.71% 0.9828± 0.0586 1.94± 03.03 98.34% 0.8362± 0.2195 64.26± 63.57
B3 0.75 0.845 79.41% 35.00% 0.9526± 0.1266 3.94± 08.71 96.54% 0.8603± 0.1981 59.83± 58.28
B4 0.95 0.840 79.30% 34.88% 0.9575± 0.1236 3.61± 09.60 96.87% 0.8994± 0.1487 48.44± 47.35
B5 1.00 0.800 79.22% 41.34% 0.9803± 0.0722 2.03± 03.64 98.17% 0.8586± 0.1948 61.14± 61.23
(a) Accuracy (b) FGS Success Rate (c) HC1 PASS
Figure 4: BANG CIFAR-10 MODELS. These plots summarize our results on CIFAR-10 models trained with BANG using combina-
tions of β and . We tested a grid of those two parameters where β ∈ [0.4, 1.0] with step size 0.05, and  ∈ [0.80, 0.86] with step size
0.005. We trained a single model with each combination and show (a) the obtained accuracy on the CIFAR-10 test set, (b) the achieved
success rates by FGS, and the (c) mean PASS score of HC1 adversarial examples on the CIFAR-10 test images. Each solid green line
represents the level of regularly trained learning models. For better visual representation we applied interpolation.
ply be due to the fact that the classifiers trained on CIFAR-
10 are less accurate, therefore, learning the incorrect sam-
ples of the batch still has a large contribution on weight
updates. While the success rates achieved by HC1 remain
high, the quality of HC1 adversarial examples degrades sig-
nificantly compared to regular training. This degradation
is highlighted by both decreasing PASS scores shown in
Figure 4(c) and by the significantly increased L∞ norms
of adversarial perturbations listed in Table 2. Finally, as
shown in Table 2, we can train classifiers with BANG that
slightly outperform models of regular training in terms of
classification accuracy. Of course, the achieved overall per-
formance depends on the chosen parameters as depicted in
Figure 4(a).
Finally, we ran experiments to better quantify and com-
pare how the robustness of the trained classifiers to random
perturbations evolves during training. Similarly to our ex-
periments on LeNet, we selected two classifiers from Ta-
ble 2 for testing: R0 trained regularly and B0 optimized
with BANG. We can see in Figure 5(a) that the regularly
trained R0 model is highly susceptible to larger distortions,
its robustness does not improve during training, and finally
achieves 46.0% with respect to the strongest class of Gaus-
sian noise that we formed by using standard deviation of
40 pixels. Contrarily, the B0 model trained with BANG re-
mains more robust throughout training epochs as shown in
Figure 5(b) and at the end 39.1% of the strongest distortions
change the original classification. The absolute improve-
ments are visualized in Figure 5(c). We can conclude that
although BANG enhanced robustness to random perturba-
tions, the results are less impressive in comparison to LeNet
– at least, with respect to the strongest distortions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced our theory to explain an in-
triguing property of machine learning models. Namely, the
regular training procedure can prevent samples from form-
ing flatter and broader regions around themselves. This
evolutionary stalling yields samples remaining close to de-
(a) Regular Training (b) BANG Training (c) Absolute Improvement
Figure 5: CIFAR-10: ROBUSTNESS TO RANDOM DISTORTIONS. These plots show the evolving robustness of CIFAR-10 models:
(a) obtained with regular training (R0 from Table 2), (b) trained with BANG (B0 from Table 2), and (c) displays the improvement. After
identifying 100 test images per class that are correctly classified by both networks at every second epoch, we perturb each 1000 times with
the level of Gaussian noise specified by the standard deviation, and test the networks at different stages of training. The plots show the
percentage of distortions yielding misclassifications. For better visual representation we applied interpolation.
cision boundaries and, hence, being susceptible to imper-
ceptibly small perturbations causing misclassifications. To
address this problem, we proposed a novel approach to im-
prove the robustness of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) by
slightly modifying the regular training procedure. Our ap-
proach does not require additional training data – neither
adversarial examples nor any sort of data augmentation – to
achieve improved robustness, while the overall performance
of the trained network is maintained or even enhanced.
We experimentally demonstrated that optimizing DNNs
with our Batch Adjusted Network Gradient (BANG) tech-
nique leads to significantly enhanced stability in general.
By balancing the contributions of batch elements on form-
ing the weight updates, BANG allows training samples to
form flatter, more invariant regions around themselves. The
trained classifiers become more robust to random distor-
tions, and as we demonstrated with the gradient-based Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS) method and the non-gradient-based
hot/cold approach where we targeted the closest scoring
class (HC1), they are also less vulnerable to adversarial ex-
ample generation methods. To visualize the advancement
achieved by BANG training in terms of improved adversar-
ial robustness, in Figure 1 correctly classified MNIST and
CIFAR-10 test images are presented along with adversarial
examples formed via the HC1 approach on DNNs trained
regularly and with BANG. While BANG helps to mitigate
adversarial instability, learning models can maintain or even
improve their overall classification performance. Our pro-
posed approach achieves these results with negligible com-
putational overhead over the regular training procedure.
Although we managed to achieve good results on two
DNNs trained on different datasets, we found that BANG
parameters needed to be adjusted to these problems. To
obtain better results, exploring the effect of different pa-
rameters on different layers, and changing the contributions
of correctly and incorrectly classified batch elements can
be considered. Future work will focus on having a bet-
ter understanding of BANG, enhancing the algorithm to be
more self-adaptive, and exploring its application for training
DNNs on real-world datasets. While some might argue that
a similar balancing effect can be achieved by distillation,
Carlini et al. [1] demonstrated that defensive distillation is
not effective to improve adversarial robustness. The effec-
tiveness of BANG to adversarial perturbations obtained via
various adversarial example generation techniques likely
varies – as Kurakin et al. [13] observed for adversarial train-
ing – and further research needs to explore that.
In summary, we can conclude that the adversarial insta-
bility of DNNs is closely related to the applied training pro-
cedures – as was claimed by Gu et al. [6] – and there is a
huge potential in this research area to further advance the
generalization properties of machine learning models and
their overall performances as well.
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